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REBEKAH R. BOHMAN,

;
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]

BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,

;1

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970532-CA
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]

Response to Appellee's Statement of the Case
This statement of the case set forth in the brief filed by plaintiff/appellee Rebekah R.
Bohman (hereinafter Rebekah) contains a number of inferences and distortions of fact not
justified by the evidence.

For that reason defendant/appellant Bradford K. Bohman

(hereinafter Brad) submits this response to the statement of the case included in Rebekah's
brief.
In her statement of the case, Rebekah suggests that Brad's efforts to clarify the court's
ruling were somehow improper. Further, she suggests that Brad's objections to the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree, which were drafted by her counsel, were also
improper, and that Brad should not have "objected as to the division of the retirement funds."
However, all of these proceedings were necessary to clarify the court's ruling. The trial
judge indicated that he was glad that Brad had moved to clarify visitation. R. at 1321. The
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree drafted by Rebekah's counsel simply did not
accurately reflect the court's ruling and even contained typographical errors that Brad's
counsel could not persuade Rebekah's counsel to change. R. at 1327, Objection No. 37, and
Plaintiffs Response, R. at 1342. Rebekah's counsel recognized that some objections were
well taken. R. at 1338-39.

In fact, the court did not rule on some major issues until the hearings on the
objections. For example, in its initial ruling on June 14, 1996, the court did not rule on
Brad's claim that he owed $77,098 to BB Ranchers. Thus, Brad was required to file an
objection to the proposed findings, conclusions, and decree. Objections to Proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, No. 35. R. at 1329. Since the court had not specified the
distribution of all the assets, both parties submitted proposed distributions, including
submissions as to division of the retirement accounts. Plaintiffs Submission Regarding
Division of Retirement Funds, R. at 1432-38. Defendant's Submission Regarding Division
of Retirement Funds, R. at 1415-31. The court then issued a written ruling. R. at 1459-60,
Appendix A. The court did not grant additional attorney's fees to Rebekah, because Brad
submitted evidence indicating that Rebekah had more liquid assets and more cash flow
available to her than he did. R. at 1528-29, Appendix B.
Rebekah also mentions that Brad has filed a petition to modify.

However, she

attempts to mislead the court by indicating that the basis for the petition to modify is the
assertion that income should be imputed to her. In fact, the primary basis for the petition to
modify is the fact that Rebekah is now living with her boyfriend, David Garside, and alimony
should be terminated because she is cohabiting. R. at 1619.
Response to Statement of Facts
Rebekah also attempts to suggest that Brad should be condemned because he did not
seek custody of Angi, her daughter by a previous marriage whom Brad had adopted. For
obvious reasons, Brad did not have the same kind of relationship with this child, who was 7
years old at the time of the marriage to Rebekah, that he had with his natural children, whom
he had lived with all their lives. He did not seek custody of Angi because he did not feel it
was in her best interest and because he respected her wishes to live with her mother.
Moreover, Angi was much closer in age to Rebekah's older children who lived with her on
and off during the marriage and after the parties' separation.
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Rebekah did admit in her testimony and to the evaluator that she sought to reconcile
with Brad because she did not want to share custody of the parties' two younger children. R.
at 606-7, Custody Evaluation at 20.
Brad also disputes the assertion that Rebekah did not work outside the home because
she was caring for the children and Brad's needs. In fact, from Brad's perspective, Rebekah
was not in the home during the last several years of the marriage, but rather shopping,
playing tennis, and engaging in entertainment and recreation. At least in part, she did not
seek employment during the separation because of her desire to travel with boyfriends and
pursue recreation. There was no evidence as to the cost of childcare if she were to return to
work. Also, Rebekah fails to mention the fact that she quit employment before the children
were born, purportedly so that she could return to college.
Facts Pertaining To Custody
The primary reason the evaluator recommended that physical custody of the parties'
children be awarded to Rebekah was to preserve the status quo. Although he mentioned
keeping the family intact, he did not interview Rebekah's four older children.

No

determination was made whether the three older children would continue to live in the home.
In fact, the evidence showed that the three older children had moved in and out of the home.
R. at 593-99.
Rebekah also disputes the claim that she drank to excess. However, she ignores the
fact that the court made a specific finding of fact indicating that she had a drinking problem.
Finding of Fact No. 14, R. at 1534. Her own mother testified that she had concerns about
Rebekah's drinking. R. at 585.
The custody evaluator also ignored all the problems suffered by Rebekah's older
children. There was extensive testimony about Cami's truancy and the fact that she had been
truant for months before Rebekah even noticed. R. at 628 and 646. The custody evaluator
ignored the out-of-wedlock child, Cami's legal problems, Rebekah's desire to have her friend
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Debbie adopt the out-of-wedlock child, and a host of other issues pertaining to the older
children.
Response to Facts Concerning the Parties
Rebekah argues that she testified that the parties had a standard of living that required
them to spend $16,000 per month. Under cross-examination, she admitted that she had no
idea what the parties were spending. R. at 558. Given Brad's net income, and the fact that
the parties had accumulated substantial assets in savings during their marriage, it would have
been impossible for them to have spent $16,000 per month. In fact, as Brad testified, the
$16,000 figure was part of a worst case scenario prepared for Brad by a financial advisor in
an effort to persuade Rebekah to curb her spending.
The trial court recognized Rebekah's propensity to overspend, finding that "plaintiff
is a profligate spender and that that was part of the problem in the parties' marriage.
Plaintiffs extravagant spending caused the court some real concerns about plaintiffs
stability and her ability to manage to stay on a budget where things are going to be somewhat
limited following this marriage." Finding of Fact No. 15, R. at 1534.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT
SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF CUSTODY TO REBEKAH
BOHMAN.

A.

Rebekah Bohman has not Cited Findings of Fact that Support the
Trial Court's Decision.

In his initial brief, Brad argued that the trial court's findings of fact were not adequate
to support its award of custody of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. In her brief,
Rebekah cites extensively from the Supreme Court's decision in Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d
1209 (Utah 1996). She suggests that Tucker overruled Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah
1986), which requires that the trial court set forth in its findings of fact the basic facts which
show why one parent is the better person to care for the child. However, Tucker did not
overrule Smith, indeed, the court in Tucker cited Smith.
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In Tucker, the Supreme Court in no way limited its prior rulings, nor those of the
Court of Appeals, concerning the necessity for adequate findings of fact in a custody case. In
fact, in citing Smith v. Smith,126 P.2d at 425, the Supreme Court said: "This court has held
that a trial court must set forth written findings of fact and conclusions of law which specify
the reasons for its custody decision." In Tucker the Supreme Court found that the trial court
had made findings of fact on numerous factors. The trial court had, in its written findings of
fact, indicated that most of these factors favored the father.
Tucker, as decided by the Supreme Court, does stand for the proposition that a
temporary custody order should not become outcome determinative. As the Supreme Court
said in Tucker, "a temporary custody order should not be given the weight of a permanent
order."
Rebekah's lengthy citations to Tucker simply do not meet the issue raised by Brad—
whether the trial court made adequate findings to support its decision with respect to custody.
In this case, more of the trial court's findings were favorable to Brad than to Rebekah. The
trial court did not explain how the findings of Rebekah that are critical may be reconciled
with its award of custody.
In her brief, Rebekah emphasizes the custody evaluation. A fair reading of that
evaluation clearly shows, however, that the basis for the recommendation that the children
live primarily with their mother was the temporary custody order and the fact that Rebekah
did not work outside the home. Because Rebekah was not employed, the custody evaluator
made the assumption that she was closer to the children and had been their primary caretaker.
The custody evaluator discounted Rebekah's drinking problem, her "dependency issues," the
many problems experienced by her older children (and in fact did not even interview those
children), and completely ignored her need to return to employment or training. Neither the
court nor the custody evaluator explained how Rebekah could continue to provide personal
care for the children and provide for herself financially in the future. In five years or sooner,
Rebekah will not receive alimony and her child support will be substantially reduced. If she
5

waits until her alimony ends to re-enter the work force, it will be impossible for her to
support herself. As the court noted, she should begin her education or return to work much
sooner than five years. Finding of Fact No. 10, R. at 1532-33.
None of the trial court's findings about Brad were negative. The trial court did not
reconcile its negative findings about Rebekah with its award of custody to her.
B.

Rebekah Bohman has not shown that the Evidence Supports the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact.

Rebekah argues that Brad has not marshaled the evidence. She claims that she will
marshal the evidence for Brad. She mentions testimony by the parties' accountant, by their
dentist, and by two of Rebekah's friends, Kathy Field and Cindy Maw. Obviously, the
accountant did not testify concerning custody. It is difficult to understand why Rebekah
would argue that his testimony ought to be marshaled to support the trial court's findings.
Kathy Field, one of Rebekah's custody witnesses, based her opinion that Rebekah was a good
mother upon her seeing Rebekah at the grocery store with her children less than once a
month. The testimony of Kathy Field that Rebekah relies on in support of the trial court's
decision to award her custody is that Rebekah, when seen at the grocery store, acts "like a
mother." R. at 941-43. This hardly requires Brad to marshal any evidence to dispute it.
Rebekah's other friend, Shirley Ann Morgan, testified that she and Rebekah and her friend
Debbie, who committed suicide, would go drinking as a group. When asked how often that
occurred in the last four years, Ms. Morgan testified "a lot." R. at 935, 1. 12. Rebekah had
also reported to Ms. Morgan about three different men that she had dated in the time since
her separation from Brad—Steven Hand, Hal Hintze, and David Garside. R. at 936.
(1)

The evidence does not support a finding that Rebekah was the
primary caretaker of the children during the last several years of
their lives.

The court and the evaluator seemed to assume that, because Rebekah did not work
outside the home, she was the primary caretaker of the children. However, the housekeeper,
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Arlene Walker, and Brad testified that Brad began to spend much more time with the boys as
they got older. Mr. Johnson, the custody evaluator, had no way of knowing how much time
Rebekah was spending with the children in the years prior to the separation except for the
reports he received from Rebekah and Brad.
It is always difficult for a finder of fact to resolve disputed testimony of the parties
concerning who is the primary caretaker of the children. The two parties, who are in the best
position to know, obviously have different perspectives and different views of the facts. For
that reason, Brad attempted to offer some objective evidence of Rebekah's absences from the
home, including her cellular telephone bills. Even though she did not have employment
outside the home, she hired Arlene Walker to care for the children two days a week (R. at
577), her older children often cared for the younger children (R. at 579), and Brad also cared
for the children.
Rebekah now attempts to argue the fact that Brad's proof that she used her cellular
phone extensively at various times, including late at night, does not show she was out of the
home. The idea that she would use the cellular phone while she was in the home is ludicrous.
The cellular phone bills clearly indicated extensive absences from the home.
Rebekah also claims that the testimony of her mother, Beth Delacruz, shows that
Rebekah made her children her top priority. However, the citation to the record provided by
Rebekah is to testimony that Ms. Delacruz had been concerned about Rebekah's supervision
of her older children prior to her marriage to Brad. R. at 590-92. Shirley Morgan, another
witness whose testimony Rebekah cites, did not testify that the children's needs were first
and foremost for Rebekah. In fact, she testified that she and Rebekah went drinking together
"a lot" in the last four years. Presumably the children were not present on these occasions.
R. at 935. Rebekah also cites the testimony of Brad's mother, but distorts that as well.
Brad's mother testified that although Rebekah had been a good mother to the boys in their
early years, later she was not in the home very often. R. at 858,11. 20-21. Brad's mother also
testified that Rebekah was a steady drinker. R. at 852. Another witness cited by Rebekah,
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Cindy Maw, testified that she and Rebekah went golfing, out to dinner, to baseball games,
and shopping together. Cindy Maw did not have children of her own. Cindy Maw and
Rebekah have been to clubs drinking together. R. at 903.
In the spring of 1995, when Rebekah and Brad had reconciled briefly, she was out of
the home taking real estate classes or simply going out for the evening for a period of several
weeks. R. at 907-8.
Rebekah also argues that the assertion that she traveled with her boyfriends is
misleading. However, she did travel extensively with her boyfriends. R. at 617. By her own
testimony, during the separation she went to Bear Lake for weekends fifteen times, to Mexico
twice, to New York, Jackson Hole, Yellowstone, Mesquite, Hawaii, Sun Valley and San
Diego. R. at 617.
(2)

The evidence does not show that the parties were equal in
promoting visitation.

Rebekah consistently has taken the position throughout these proceedings that Brad is
controlling.

The basis for this seems to be Brad's desire to maintain a meaningful

relationship with his children.
confrontations.

The parties both testified that they have had difficult

Brad testified that Rebekah had hit him on one occasion when he was

dropping off the children from visitation.
Rebekah also testified that Brad was critical of her. However, she ignores the fact
that she was consistently critical of Brad. In fact, her statement that he is controlling is
certainly a critical one. Rebekah also testified that doctors are controlling, and for that reason
she had decided not to work in the medical field. R. at 614. Dr. Hales, the parties' dentist,
with whom Rebekah had a personal relationship, is hardly a person qualified to testify about
Brad's personality characteristics. Although Mr. Johnson, the custody evaluator, said he had
concerns about control issues, that testimony was based on the fact that Brad disputed his
custody evaluation. R. at 701. Mr. Johnson was also offended that he had been served with a
subpoena to obtain the documents backing up the custody evaluation. R. at 701-2. Mr.
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Johnson was obviously offended that Brad did not accept his recommendation. Only at trial
did he realize that Rebekah had also rejected his recommendation. R. at 702.
Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that Rebekah consistently created obstacles to
his visitation with the children. With respect to Angi, Rebekah would make plans to do
things with Angi during the time that she should otherwise have been visiting with her father.
R. at 776-78. With respect to visitation with the two younger boys. Brad's uncontro verted
testimony was that Rebekah had, on several occasions, left town with the children during
what would otherwise have been Brad's visitation time without notice to Brad. R. at 778-79.
Brad also testified that Rebekah had not provided telephone numbers when she traveled with
the children out of town. R. at 779.
Despite the court's order that Brad be allowed to provide care for the children when
Rebekah was going to be going out for the evening or travelling, Rebekah did not allow Brad
to do so. R. at 781. In addition, Brad did all of the transportation for visitation. R. at 782.
(3)

The evidence did not support the finding that Rebekah had
greater flexibility to provide personal care for the children.

Obviously, the court based this finding on the fact that Rebekah was unemployed.
However, as has previously been discussed, the court recognized the need for Rebekah to
return to employment or education.

The uncontradicted evidence showed that Brad's

schedule allowed him to be home during the week a great deal and that he had the ability to
provide backup care for the children when he was on call in his position as an
anesthesiologist.
(4)

The evidence did not support the finding that Rebekah can
provide adequately for the children financially.

As noted, the only evidence supporting this finding of the fact is the court's award of
alimony of $4,225 per month and child support of $3,000 per month. There was extensive
evidence that Rebekah continued to go into debt even though she was receiving temporary
support in a high amount. The evidence clearly showed that Rebekah had failed to make
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mortgage payments on time, and she testified that she had difficulty making ends meet. The
court's finding that Rebekah is a profligate spender and that the court was concerned about
her stability and ability to manage money contradicted its finding that she would be able to
provide adequately for the children financially in the future.
(5)

The evidence does not support a finding that the parties are equal
in moral character.

In her brief, Rebekah characterizes the evidence that Brad presented as to her
background as a "smear campaign." Unfortunately, in a contested custody proceeding, both
parties are required to call attention to the negative aspects of the other party's background
and character. The negative information about Rebekah would not be material except as it
reveals her ability to parent the children.
Rebekah's own testimony indicated that she had taken her four older children to live
with her in the home of her third husband knowing that he was abusive and an alcoholic. R.
at 602. After she left that relationship and began to date Brad, she sent her three older
children to live with their father. These are facts that bear directly on her ability to parent the
children whose custody was at issue in these proceedings.
Attempting to divert attention from these facts, Rebekah indicates Brad was found to
be "intense" by his therapist. This is hardly relevant to his moral character.
Of even greater concern was the difference that the evidence showed in the two
parties' values. The history of Rebekah's three older children indicates that they had a great
deal of trouble with their academic programs in high school. Rebekah's own testimony
indicated that the values on which she placed the most emphasis had to do with appearance,
rather than substance. R. at 532.
The trial court seemingly ignored all the evidence concerning Rebekah's history and
the impact that history had had on her older children. Rebekah's only defense to this is the
repeated refrain that Brad is controlling. In her brief, Rebekah has not offered any evidence
to support the finding that the parties are of equal moral character.
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Brad has marshaled the evidence to demonstrate that it is insufficient to support the
trial court's findings on these issues. For that reason, the Court of Appeals should find that
the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact.
IL

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING
VISITATION ARE INADEQUATE.

In her brief, Rebekah argues that the trial court's award of visitation was proper and
that Brad's desire to have more visitation is simply an example of his controlling personality.
That argument simply does not deal with the issues. Brad agrees with the statement
of law set forth in Rebekah's brief that the trial court must give the highest priority to the
welfare of the children in determining visitation rights. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah
App. 1992). However, in this case, the court more or less accepted Rebekah's suggestions
with respect to visitation without taking into account Brad's better ability to facilitate the
children's education, the extreme flexibility of Brad's schedule, the recommendation of the
custody evaluator that the temporary visitation schedule continue, or the evaluator's
recommendation that there should be flexibility to allow for continuity of visitation.
The trial court failed to tie its factual findings to the visitation schedule it ordered.
The court did not explain why its acceptance of the visitation schedule Rebekah suggested
would promote the children's welfare.

For that reason, its findings on this issue are

inadequate.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE IMPUTED INCOME TO
REBEKAH.

In her brief, Rebekah argues that the trial court should not impute income to her
because the issue was not raised at trial. However, the issue was raised and argued at trial.
Moreover, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997), requires that the court impute
income to a parent to at least the federal minimum wage level for a forty hour work week.
Brad was not required to present evidence in order for the court to have that legal duty.
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Rebekah also argued that the court found that it would not be economical for her to
return to work because of the cost of clothing and daycare. However, in the very same
sentence, the court found that "plaintiff should obtain employment or go to school." Finding
of Fact No. 29, R. at 1542.
In this case, Rebekah was already using surrogate care for the children. (Brad was
also available to provide care.) The court made no specific findings as to the actual cost of
childcare for Rebekah, but did accept Rebekah's statement of monthly living expenses for
purposes of calculating alimony and child support which included $250 per month for
childcare and $50 per month for preschool. The court also ignored the fact that Braxton was
age 6, and Bryson was age 5 at the time of trial. Braxton was already in kindergarten and
Bryson was scheduled to begin kindergarten in the fall of the year of trial, 1996, not two or
three years in the future. Rebekah also included in her budget a monthly clothing expense of
$350, and a drying cleaning expense of $60. It is difficult to imagine that those items would
necessarily increase if she were employed.
The court clearly understood the fact that Rebekah needed to return to work in order
to develop an ability to support herself prior to the termination of her alimony. Despite
making those findings, however, the court imputed no income to her. Under UTAH CODE
ANN. 78-45-7.5(7)(C) (Supp. 1997), the court was required to do so.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS
TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT.

In this case the court simply awarded $1,000 per month per child as child support
without any evidentiary basis. The court entered no findings whatsoever to support that
award.
Rebekah argues that Brad stipulated to the amount of child support. However, she
cannot point to a place in the record where this alleged stipulation took place. Rather, she
argues that because she asked for $1,500 per month in temporary child support and received
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$1,000 per month per child as temporary child support, Brad had somehow agreed to that
amount.
Brad argued vigorously against Rebekah's receiving the amount of temporary
alimony and child support she sought. At trial, he was seeking custody of his two children,
Braxton and Bryson. Therefore, his argument was as to the amount of child support he
should pay for Angi, the child whom he had adopted and who would presumably continue to
live with Rebekah. Brad's counsel argued as follows:
Our suggestion would be that if custody of the boys is awarded to Brad, that child
support for Angi be set in accordance with the guidelines at the highest level, to take
into account both the fact that his income is above the guidelines, but not require
payment of child support from Rebekah to him.
R. at 1141.
Brad's position was that if custody of the three children were to be awarded to
Rebekah, child support should be set at the highest amount for three children set forth in the
table or $1,808. Utah law requires an award of at least that amount, but requires additional
findings of fact if an award is to be made in excess of that amount. Ball v. Peterson, 912
P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996). In Ball, the trial court had arrived at its monthly child support
award through linear extrapolation from the child support table. The trial court in Ball had
provided no findings to explain how it arrived at the amount of child support. The Court of
Appeals said that a trial court must consider and make specific findings on all "appropriate
and just" factors in awarding such child support.
In this case, the $1,000 per month per child figure was chosen arbitrarily. The fact
that $ 1,000 per month per child was awarded as temporary child support has no bearing on
the trial court's duty to make factual findings. Brad never agreed that $1,000 per month per
child was a proper amount of child support. It was not his burden to present evidence as to a
proposed child support award over the guidelines since he had proposed child support in
accordance with the guidelines.
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Rebekah also argues that the factual findings in this case are adequate because the
court made findings with respect to the parties' incomes. The trial court in Ball had also
made findings as to the parties' incomes. Although Rebekah testified that she had $7,258 per
month in expenses, she presented no breakdown as to which part of those expenses were for
her and which for the children. The trial court did not make any findings as to the children's
needs and simply awarded child support and alimony so that the total came to the amount
Rebekah sought. Without factual findings supporting the award in excess of the guideline
amounts, the trial court's child support award cannot stand.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS
OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS ALIMONY AWARD.

The parties agree on the legal standards for awarding alimony. The parties disagree,
however, about whether the trial court in this case adequately examined the three necessary
factors that it must examine in determining alimony.
A.

The Trial Court did not make Adequate Findings of Fact as to
Rebekah's Needs.

Rebekah testified at trial that she did not know how much the parties were spending
prior to their separation (R. at 558), and that she had no idea of what their household
expenses had been. R. at 558,11. 21-23. Rebekah's testimony made it clear that the expenses
she claimed were not actual expenses but simply estimates. R. at 566. Some of the expenses
were obviously inflated. For example, food and household supplies for one woman and three
children was $1,000. Rebekah wasn't able to identify anything that was included in her
claimed miscellaneous and incidentals of $100. R. at 565-66.
The court did not critically examine any of Rebekah's claimed expenses, instead it
simply awarded her the full amount of alimony and child support she claimed to need.
Rebekah also argues that Brad agreed not to argue that her expenses related to the
house were not realistic. However, the actual stipulation, as reflected in Finding of Fact No.
31, was that Brad would not argue that a change of circumstances had taken place if Rebekah
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chose to purchase a less expensive home. R. at 1543. Of course, the record reflects that
Rebekah did not purchase a less expensive home. R. at 1518.
B.

The Trial Court did not Make Adequate Findings as to Brad's
Ability to pay or Rebekah's Ability to Contribute to Her Own
Support.

As noted in Brad's initial brief, although the trial court found that his annual gross
income was $278,000, it made no finding as to his net income. Rebekah relies on the
testimony of her accountant to establish Brad's net income. However, the accountant found i
that Brad's net expendable income would be $7,843, not $8,400 as claimed in Rebekah's
brief, if Rebekah received the alimony she sought. The trial court found that Brad had
reasonable living expenses of between $8,300 to $8,900 per month. Finding of Fact No. 30,
R. at 1542. Obviously, Brad could not meet living expenses of $8,300-$8,900 per month on
$7,843, the amount of net expendable monthly income, the accountant estimated. Appendix
to Appellee's brief at 41. Thus, the trial court either ignored Mr. Passey's testimony and did
not make any finding at all as to Brad's expendable net monthly income, or determined that
Rebekah should be awarded sufficient alimony and child support to meet all of her claimed
monthly expenses and that Brad should have a shortfall in meeting his reasonable monthly
living expenses of between $457 and $1,057.
Without findings of fact on these issues, it is impossible to determine what figures the
court actually used and what the court's reasoning was with respect to its alimony award. By
failing to make adequate findings of fact on this issue the court abused its discretion.
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994).
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings of Fact as to
the Duration of Alimony.

Rebekah argues that the trial court had no duty to make a finding of fact as to its
reasoning for the duration of alimony. At the same time, Rebekah argues that the trial court
implicitly made such findings of fact.
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The record reflected that Rebekah had made no effort during the parties' separation to
obtain employment or education. In fact, she had not even settled on a career direction.
When she went to college during the relationship with Brad, she wanted to become a nurse.
R. at 614. She changed her mind about that profession because she found doctors to be
controlling. Id. at 614. When she answered interrogatories, she indicated she wanted to get a
master's degree in business. Id. at 11. 18-20. Rebekah then decided she wanted to pursue an
eighteen-month degree in sport's medicine. She hadn't made any decisions about that. R. at
615. She had also taken real estate classes and then dropped out of that process. R. at 615.
Rebekah argues that Brad should have presented evidence as to the duration of
Rebekah's alimony. However, since Rebekah was the party seeking alimony, she had the
burden to show her need and the appropriate duration. The trial court made no findings as to
duration and simply accepted Rebekah's suggestion that she receive alimony for a period of
five years.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CERTAIN
ITEMS OF BRAD'S PREMARITAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN
CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

In her brief, Rebekah first argues that Rebekah should have received credit for
premarital assets which she had sold or disposed of prior to the marriage. This argument
distorts the evidence. Rebekah testified that the Porsche she owned prior to the marriage was
sold before the marriage. R. at 622. Thus, the Porsche was not Rebekah's premarital
property, since, she did not own it at the time of the marriage to Brad. Likewise, the couch
that Rebekah claimed as premarital property was sold to her mother. Most of the other items
for which she did not receive credit as premarital property she still has in her possession. R.
at 623. The issues raised by Rebekah as to her premarital property seem to be an attempt to
divert attention from the legitimate issues raised by Brad.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has directly addressed the issue
of how to treat cash held by a party prior to marriage. In this case, Brad had cash at the
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beginning of the marriage and there was more cash at the end of the marriage. The trial
court's finding that the cash had been consumed is not logical.
A.

The Fidelity Investment Account.

At the time of his marriage to Rebekah, Brad had $50,529 in his Fidelity Investment
USA account X29002453. At the time of the divorce the assets held in Fidelity Investment
USA account X29002453 totaled more than $180,000. (Defendant's Exhibit 44a). Thus, the
account had not changed form. Rebekah's name never appeared on the account. Brad was
the person in whose name the account was held and who could sign checks. R. at 998.
Because Brad had added to the account during the marriage, he did not claim the
entire account was premarital property. Instead, he sought a credit for the amount held in the
account at the time of the marriage. The cash that existed in the Fidelity Investment account
in September of 1989 had not been consumed. More funds had been added to the account.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that this premarital asset had been consumed simply was
not supported by the evidence.
B.

The Key Bank Checking Account.

At the time of the marriage, Brad had $21,286 in his account with Key Bank.
(Defendant's Exhibit 44a). The money from this account was transferred to the First Security
Bank checking account. At the time of the divorce, the court found that Brad had $23,687 in
this First Security account. Thus, although the same dollars were not in the account at the
time of the marriage, the cash in the account had not been consumed and should have been
awarded to Brad as premarital property.
C.

The 1986 Jeep Cherokee.

Brad's 1986 Jeep Cherokee had been sold during the marriage and the proceeds
deposited into the parties' account. This testimony was not disputed. Rebekah suggests that
Brad should have offered additional evidence as to what happened to these monies. It is
difficult to determine why that should be the case when there was no dispute. Obviously, the
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proceeds of the sale of the Jeep Cherokee augmented the marital estate. Had those monies
not been added to the marital estate, the marital estate would have been smaller.
Rebekah cites Willey vs. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993), for the proposition
that premarital property that has been consumed cannot be found to be separate property.
The Willey case is factually different from the present case. In Willey, plaintiff claimed that
she should have been awarded the amount of equity she had in a home at the time the parties
married. However, when the parties divorced, they had no equity in their home. In fact,
when the marital home was sold, the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to pay the
obligations. Thus, the plaintiffs premarital asset had truly been consumed. That is, the
equity in the premarital home had been used for the parties' expenses during the marriage. In
this case, Brad's premarital assets were not consumed since the size of the marital estate
exceeded the size of the premarital estate. For that reason, the trial court should have given
him credit for the premarital assets.
D.

Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Account.

In his initial brief, Brad erred in indicating that the trial court had not given him credit
for the debt he owed Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology. This was an error on the part of
counsel, for which counsel apologizes.
However, the argument that Brad did not present evidence that he had $35,901 in his
business account when the parties married is simply wrong. Both parties relied on the
statement provided by Brad as an attachment to Exhibit 44a, Exhibit 9. There was no dispute
to the authenticity or accuracy of that exhibit. Rebekah does not explain why the accounts
receivable of Rocky Mountain Anesthesiologists were a premarital asset for which Brad
should receive a premarital credit and the current accounts receivable were a marital asset
which should be charged to Brad on the balance sheet, if the $35,901 held in Brad's cash
account should not also be credited.
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E.

Loan to Brad's Brother Brent and Loan to Rebekah.

Rebekah argues that Brad should not have received a credit for the $10,000 he had
loaned his brother prior to the marriage that was repaid during the marriage, because the
monies went into the parties' joint account and were used for family expenses. Repayment of
the loan augmented the marital estate by $10,000. The marital estate had increased in value
during the marriage. Accordingly, Brad should have received a credit for the loan.
Likewise, it was Brad's uncontroverted testimony that he had loaned $17,000 to
Rebekah prior to the marriage and that the loan had not been repaid. The trial court did not
indicate why this amount should not be repaid. In her brief, Rebekah argues that the statute
of limitations would have been a defense to this loan. However, the statute does not begin to
run until the demand had been made.

Further, Rebekah never asserted this statute of

limitations as a defense at trial. Brad should have been awarded premarital credits as to both
loans.
F.

Rebekah's $5,000 Premarital Credit.

The trial court treated Rebekah's claim for premarital credit quite differently from
Brad's. Although she originally claimed $16,000 in premarital assets, when the evidence
showed that most of those assets had been sold before the marriage, she reduced her claim to
$5,000. After trial, the three bedroom sets which comprised the majority of Rebekah's
premarital property were appraised. The appraiser estimated the value at $655. The court did
not explain why it did not simply return Rebekah's personal property to her or how it arrived
at the figure of $5,000 for the premarital property. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
giving Rebekah $5,000 credit for her premarital property.
Rebekah argues that the trial court treated her the same way it treated Brad by giving
her $5,000 of the $16,000 that she originally requested in premarital credit.

However,

Rebekah herself amended her request when the evidence did not support it. In fact, the trial
court ultimately gave her all of the $5,000 in credit she requested.
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VII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS CONCERNING THE
VALUE OF THE FIRST SECURITY CHECKING ACCOUNT,
VAN, AND THE ROSS DRIVE HOME EQUITY
ARE
INADEQUATE.

As set forth in Brad's original brief, the trial court's findings of fact concerning its
property division must be sufficiently detailed to disclose court's reasoning in resolving
factual issues. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d, 64 (Utah. App. 1991). It is Brad's position that
the court failed to make sufficient findings as to the valuation of certain personal property.
A~

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Regarding the Value of the
Van Were Inadequate.

The trial court accepted the value of the van asserted by Rebekah over the value of the
van asserted by Brad, despite the fact that Brad was willing to take the van on his side of the
ledger at the higher value. Rebekah asserted the value at a trade-in level, Brad used a retail
level.

The trial court did not make any findings of fact to support its acceptance of

Rebekah's value. In doing so, it erred.
B.

The Trial Court Findings of Fact as to Brad's First Security
Account Were Inadequate.

Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that the balance in his First Security checking
account as of the date of trial was $12,870. However, the court decided to use the last
statement balance, despite Brad's uncontroverted testimony that a mistake had been made
and an extra amount of $10,816 deposited into the account and later withdrawn.
Because there was no evidence to contradict Brad's testimony, the trial court erred in
using the higher figure.
C.

Ross Drive Proceeds.

Prior to the marriage, Brad had purchased a house on Ross Drive.

The

uncontroverted evidence indicated that Rebekah contributed nothing to the down payment on
the house, and nothing to the costs of remodeling all of which took place before the marriage.
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The Ross Drive home was sold and Brad presents documentary evidence that the net
proceeds of the sale were $50,470.
The $40,000 figure the trial court used as a premarital credit apparently came from a
loan application Brad had filled out in October of 1989 that showed the value of the house,
by Brad's estimate at that time, to be $150,000 and the mortgage to be $110,000. Obviously,
these figures were mere estimates. The trial court failed to explain in its findings of fact why
it chose to use an estimated figure instead of the actual proceeds of sale. Because it did not
make this explanation, its findings of fact were inadequate.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A FOUR-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE BB RANCHERS'
OBLIGATION.
In her brief, Rebekah attempts to reargue her position at trial that the court should not
recognize Brad's obligation to BB Ranchers as a martial obligation. However, Rebekah has
not cross-appealed and this court is not free to reexamine that issue.
Rebekah also argues that the trial court committed error by finding the BB Ranchers'
obligation to be a marital obligation, but not including the accounts receivable of BB
Ranchers as a martial asset. No evidence was presented at trial that account receivables
existed and Rebekah never took such a position at trial.
In fact, Rebekah did not make her argument as to the effect of the statute of
limitations on this obligation at trial. This case was tried in April of 1996. The court issued
its original decision on June 14, 1996. However, in its original decision, the court did not
rule on the BB Ranchers' obligation. In October of 1996, the court held a hearing on the
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree. Only then, for the
first time, did counsel for Rebekah raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the BB
Ranchers' obligation. Transcript of hearing on October 17, 21, 1996, at 76-81, Appendix C.
Because Rebekah has not cross-appealed, the court must assume that this obligation is
valid, as the trial court found. Thus, the only issue is the amount of the obligation.
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As indicated in Brad's opening brief, the trial court did not identify which statute of
limitations it intended to apply. The parties have assumed that the trial court meant to apply
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996). Although the court made no such finding, nor was any
evidence presented that at any defense to the obligation had ever been asserted.
Rebekah argues in her brief that a debt was created each year to BB Ranchers and that
at the close of each year, the debt was final, due and payable. No such evidence was adduced
at trial. Brad's testimony was that he had a running obligation to BB Ranchers. Under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996), an action may be commenced "at any time within four years
after the last charge is made or the last payment is received." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-1225(1) (1996).
In this situation, the last charge at issue was made at the tax year 1995. Thus, the
statute of limitations had not expired for any of the obligation.
The statute of limitations, which was not raised as a defense to this obligation until
sometime after trial, does not apply to decrease the obligation to BB Ranchers. In so finding,
the trial court erred.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT
THE
WEDDING
RING
WAS
REBEKAH'S
PREMARITAL PROPERTY.

In her brief, Rebekah argues for the first time that the wedding ring at issue was given
to her before marriage and thus was premarital property. However, there was no evidence
that the wedding ring was given to her prior to the marriage. In fact, it is Brad's position that
the wedding ring was actually given after the marriage. The trial court apparently assumed
that the wedding ring had been given before marriage, but no evidence was presented to this
effect.
If Rebekah bases her position with respect to the wedding ring on her contention that
it was an item of premarital property, she must point to some evidence in the record that
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supports that. In fact, Brad's position was that the wedding ring was actually purchased after
the marriage took place was marital property as was the other jewelry.
X.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE APPROPRIATE
FINDINGS UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO REBEKAH.

It is difficult to reconcile the trial court's finding in this case of some need for
assistance with Rebekah's attorney's fees, with its findings that she would receive a
substantial amount of cash in the property distribution (approximately $192,109), the fact
that she had already used $11,500 of marital funds to pay attorney's fees, and the fact that she
would receive $7,225 as alimony and child support. R. at 1528-29, Appendix B.
Later in these proceedings, the court found that Brad's ability to pay attorney's fees
was not as great as Rebekah's, given the circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court abused
its discretion in requiring Brad to pay an additional $5,000 of Rebekah's attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Rebekah claims that the record in this case shows Brad's need to control. In fact, her
response to most of the legal issues he has raised is that he has a controlling nature.
However, it is equally true that Rebekah wished to control the outcome of these proceedings.
Ironically, Rebekah has taken the same position that the custody evaluator took in this
case. The custody evaluator came to the conclusion that Brad had control issues because
Brad did not agree with his evaluation. The custody evaluator chose to be offended because
Brad asked to see the documents backing up the evaluation. Likewise, Rebekah simply
accuses Brad of being controlling whenever he does not agree with her position on an issue.
In her brief, Rebekah has not demonstrated the trial court made adequate findings of fact on
the issues raised on this appeal. She has not explained how the trial court's negative findings
of fact may be reconciled with its award of custody to her or why this court should affirm the
trial court's failure to deal with important issues, such as the behavior of her older children.
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With respect to the financial issues, Rebekah has not explained why this court should
sustain the trial court's award of child support without any findings of fact or how the
findings of fact pertaining to alimony meet the requirements of case law. Likewise, the trial
court's ruling with respect to premarital property and the values of marital property did not
have an inadequate basis in its findings of fact.
The record also does not support even a partial award of attorney's fees to Rebekah.
She should not be awarded her attorney's fees in connection with this appeal, since the trial
court has found that she now has more cash available than Brad does under the awards made
by the court.
DATED this ^

day of March, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ELLEN MXY^OCK
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered, by hand, to the following, this ^ d a y of
March, 1998.
B. L. Dart
Sharon L. Donovan
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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n ^ STRICT COURt

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

REBEKAH R. BOHMAN,
RULING
Plaintiff,

vs.
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,
Case No. 944901996
Defendant.

Both parties have submitted memoranda on the proper division
of retirements

funds. The court apologizes

for the delay in

deciding this issue but it has been under an oppressive trial
schedule that has made it difficult for the court to take earlier
action in this case. In addition, the court's decision list
contained a clerical error that indicated that the Notice to Submit
for Decision had been filed on November 29, 1996. In reality the
notice was filed on November 20; thus the court went beyond the 60day period

in which cases should be decided, but it did so

inadvertently.
In this case, the court orders that the martial assets between
the parties be equalized. The court likely created some confusion
when it previously directed that this was to be accomplished
through the distribution of retirement

funds and for that it

apologizes. The court believes that the plaintiff should have
sufficient
standard

of

liquidity
living

to get into a home commensurate
to which

she

is accustomed.

to the

However,

in

allocating the assets to achieve this objective, the court is

1459

Ruling
Case No. 944901996
Page 2
reluctant to allocate a disproportionate share of the retirement
funds to defendant because they are encumbered by tax obligations
and potential penalties. It is inappropriate and inequitable in
this case to equate pre-tax dollars with post-tax dollars in any
such allocation.
The court finds that plaintiff will have sufficient liquid
funds to purchase a suitable home and to pay her attorneys' fees if
she is awarded the assets as outlined in page 2 of defendant's
Response to Plaintiff's Submission Re: Division of Retirement
Funds, which include one-half of the Charles Schwab Bohman Family
Trust Account and her share of the Fidelity USA investment account.
The retirement accounts may therefore be divided equally between
the parties.
Dated this Q£-D day of January, 1997.

MkiiL

Michael D. Lyon,Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^ \

day of January, 1997, I sent

a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to counsel as
follows:
B.L. Dart
Sharon A. Donovan
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ellen Maycock
Pamela S. Nighswonger
Kruse, Landa & Maycock, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034

h

. laAfikh

Deputy' Qourt Clerk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

REBEKAH R. BOHMAN,
RULING
Plaintiff,

vs.
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,
Case No. 9<$9Q£996
Defendant.
—i en

Plaintiff seeks assistance from the defendant cto j*>ay her
attorneys'

fees

of

$6,572

incurred

since

the

clarification following the parties1 divorce trial.

inpti^n
c:
3

for

°

The court awarded to the plaintiff monthly alimony of $4,225.
This support, when coupled with the indirect benefit she receives
from $3,000 in child support to help pay such things as her
mortgage, utilities, and other living expenses, is adequate to meet
her financial obligation to her lawyers. Additionally, she has
access to ample liquidity from her share of the other assets
awarded to her in the marriage. Further, the court does not find
any unusual current financial needs not contemplated when the court
gave its decision.
On the other hand, defendant, by affidavit, attests to earning
only $241,000 in 1996, rather than his historical annual income of
$278,000,

on which

the court predicated

its other

financial

rulings, including the previous award for $16,500 of attorneys'
fees. On balance, the plaintiff is now in a much better position to
pay the requested fees than the defendant.
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Ruling
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Accordingly,

plaintiff1s

request

for

additional

fees is

denied.
Dated t h i s

day of A p r i l ,

1997.

M i c h a S T ^ . Lfcfa,

Judde

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Ajj^oay of April, 1997, I sent
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to counsel as
follows:
Ellen Maycock
Kruse, Landa & Maycock, LLC
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Bert L. Dart
Sharon A. Donovan
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Deputy Court Clerk

#
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EXHIBITS, IF I MAY HAND THOSE TO YOU.
THE COURT:

SURE.

MR. DART:

WHAT NUMBER?

MS. MAYCOCK:

NUMBER 63

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

MS. MAYCOCK:

—

~

WAS A LETTER FROM DR. BOHMAN'S

BROTHER TALKING ABOUT THE ACCOUNT.

AND THEN WHILE WE WERE IN

TRIAL IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS SOME DISPUTE ABOUT WHAT THIS
OBLIGATION CALCULATION WAS AND WE BOTH PUT OUR ACCOUNTANTS TO
WORK ON THAT.

AND WHILE MR. DART'S ACCOUNTANT CERTAINLY DID

NOT CONCEDE THAT THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE OBLIGATION, HE DID
HAVE INPUT INTO THE CALCULATION AND WE HAD ATTACHED THIS
CALCULATION TO OUR EXHIBIT 45-A, WHICH WAS THE AMENDED ONE.
THIS WAS THE CALCULATION OF WHAT THE OBLIGATION WAS FOR THE
YEARS OF THE MARRIAGE.

WHAT THIS WAS, YOUR HONOR, TO GIVE YOU

THE BACKGROUND, DURING THE MARRIAGE, DR. BOHMAN'S FAMILY
AGREED THAT HE COULD TAKE THE TAX CREDITS THAT CAME FROM B.B.
RANCHERS TO THE EXCLUSION OF HIS OTHER PARTNERS IN B.B.
RANCHERS BECAUSE HE WAS IN A BETTER POSITION TO MAKE USE OF
THEM THAN THE OTHER PARTNERS.

BUT HIS AGREEMENT WITH B.B.

RANCHERS, WITH HIS FAMILY, WAS THAT THESE WOULD ACT AS A LOAN,
AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY THESE AMOUNTS BACK TO B.B.
RANCHERS.

OBVIOUSLY, THE PARTIES HAD THE BENEFIT DURING THEIR

MARRIAGE OF $66,000 IN FEDERAL TAX CREDITS AND $10,000 IN
STATE TAX CREDITS.

OBVIOUSLY, IT'S OUR POSITION THAT HAVING
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THOSE TAX CREDITS MADE THEM —

MADE THE MARITAL ESTATE GROW

BECAUSE OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE PAID THAT, THOSE AMOUNTS TO
THE GOVERNMENT.

DR. BOHMAN'S POSITION IS HE'S GOT TO PAY

THESE AMOUNTS BACK TO HIS FAMILY.

HE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE

PAID THEM ALREADY BUT DID NOT DO SO BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF
THESE PROCEEDINGS AND NOT WANTING TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION
WITH THE COURT THAT HE WAS DOING SOMETHING IMPROPER.
WE HAVE ALSO NOW ARGUED THAT BECAUSE THE COURT RULED THAT
THE CASH THAT DR. BOHMAN HAD BEFORE THE MARRIAGE WAS CONSUMED
DURING THE MARRIAGE, THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE
COURT TO CONSIDER THE PREMARITAL PORTION OF THE B.B. RANCHERS
OBLIGATION, WHICH HE COULD HAVE USED THAT CASH TO PAY IF IT
HADN'T BE CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE, WHICH WOULD BRING THE
TOTAL OBLIGATION TO $117,098.

SO THAT'S WHAT THE NATURE OF

THIS ARGUMENT IS ABOUT AND THE COURT DID NOT RULE ON THIS.
WHEN WE GOT YOUR RULING FROM YOU IN JUNE, I SHOULD HAVE
BROUGHT IT TO YOUR ATTENTION THEN AND IN THE —

WITH THE

NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THAT DAY, JUST DID
NOT DO SO.
THE COURT:

MR. DART.

MR. DART:

THIS WAS A HOTLY CONTESTED ISSUE, YOUR

HONOR.

AND IN FACT, BASED UPON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE COURT

DEALT WITH PREMARITAL PROPERTY, IT WAS MY ASSUMPTION THE COURT
HAD DENIED HIS REQUEST.

THE FACT IS THAT -- AND THE COURT

NEEDS TO KEEP IN MIND WE'RE NOT DEALING WITH THE FAMILY RANCH
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HERE.

THAT'S A DIFFERENT CORPORATION.

THIS IS B.B. RANCHERS

IN WHICH DR. BOHMAN, IF MY PERCENTAGES ARE RIGHT, OWNS ABOUT
98 PERCENT.
IS —

AND HE PUT $300,000 INTO THIS RANCH, AND THEN HE

THOSE ASSETS ARE BEING DEPRECIATED.

AND ON EACH YEAR'S

TAX RETURNS, THEY WOULD TAKE THE DEPRECIATION AND OFFSET IT
AGAINST INCOME, WHICH INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF THEIR REFUND,
WHICH GOT USED UP AND CONSUMED IN THE MARRIAGE OR REDUCED THE
AMOUNT OF TAXES THAT HAD TO BE USED WITH THE MONEY GOING
ELSEWHERE.

AND ALL OF THIS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE MARRIAGE.

HIS CLAIM AT TRIAL THEN CAME OUT, WELL, I TO HAVE PAY THAT
BACK, THIS IS A DEBT.
CLAIM GOES AWAY OR —
TO DR. BOHMAN.

IF IT'S NOT A DEALT, THEN I SUBMIT THE
AND BECAUSE IT'S DR. BOHMAN OWING MONEY

EAST ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS TRANSACTION.

OWNS 98 PERCENT OF B.B. RANCHERS.
DOCUMENTATION OF ANY DEBT —
METICULOUS RECORD KEEPER —

HE

THE FACT IS THAT THE ONLY

AND WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A
IS A LETTER THAT HE HAD RECEIVED

AND HOW IT WAS GENERATED AND HOW IT CAME ABOUT, I DON'T KNOW,
BUT IT'S THIS EXHIBIT 63 THAT WAS CREATED MARCH 22, 1996,
WITHIN A MONTH OF TRIAL, SAYING, OH, BY THE WAY, YOU OWE B.B.
RANCHERS MONEY GOING BACK SEVEN YEARS.
THIS, THIS GOES CLEAR BACK TO 1989.

IF YOU'LL LOOK AT

IT'S A TOTAL OF ACTUALLY

OF SEVEN YEARS OF TAX RETURNS, AND NOW IT'S TIME TO PAY.

IN

FACT, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WOULD KNOCK OUT THREE YEARS
OF IT.

IT WOULD KNOCK OUT THE EARLIER ONES, ONE, TWO.

THE

INTERESTING FACT IS DR. BOHMAN AT NO TIME UP UNTIL WE'RE IN
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TRIAL EVER DOCUMENTED A CLAIM FOR AN OBLIGATION OF THIS KIND.
AND IN HIS INTERROGATORY ANSWERS THAT WE'VE BEEN RELYING ON,
CERTIFIED UNDER OATH WE ASKED HIM IN INTERROGATORY NUMBER 17,
DO YOU HAVE ANY OUTSTANDING OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING MORTGAGES,
PROMISSORY NOTES, CREDITORS, OR PROMISSORY NOTES.

IF SO, FOR

EACH OBLIGATION STATE A RESPONSE YES, THE MORTGAGE ON THE
HOUSE.

NO CLAIM WAS —

OR NO OBLIGATION WAS ASSERTED FOR THIS

NEW CLAIM TO B.B. RANCHERS, AND I SUBMIT THAT'S EVIDENCE OF
AND DEMONSTRATIVE OF THE FACT THAT EVEN DR. BOHMAN DOESN'T
BELIEVER THERE'S A LIABILITY THERE.

IN FACT, IF YOU RECALL

HIS TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, I SAID, NOW, WAIT, YOU'RE SAYING YOU
OWE B.B. RANCHERS THIS MONEY.

WHAT ARE THEY GIVING YOU FOR

THE USE OF YOUR $300,000 OVER THE SEVEN YEARS?

AND HE SAID,

WELL, I'VE MEANING TO TALK TO THEM ABOUT THAT.

I SUBMIT THAT

THERE —

THERE'S NEVER GOING TO BE A PAYMENT MADE BY

DR. BOHMAN OR IT'S GOING TO BE OFFSET AGAINST OTHER THINGS.

I

SUBMIT IT'S NOT A TRUE DEBT AND I SUBMIT THAT THIS BENEFIT
THAT THESE PARTIES HAD ON THEIR TAX RETURNS GAVE THEM MONEY TO
SPEND, TO LIVE ON, AND NOW THE DOCTOR IS ATTEMPTING TO COME
AFTER THE FACT, CREATE THIS PHANTOM OBLIGATION, AND SAY BY THE
WAY, I NEED TO PAY MYSELF BACK THIS MONEY THAT IS -- THAT
IS —

WE UTILIZED ON OUR TAX RETURNS.

THE COURT DID NOT SPEAK

TO IT ONE WAY ARE THE OTHER IN THE RULING.

IT WAS —

THE COURT:

I REMEMBER THE ISSUE.

MR. DART:

IT WAS THAT KIND OF AN ISSUE.
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THE COURT:

UH-HUH.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT

TO SAY?
MS. MAYCOCK:

JUST, YOUR HONOR, THE REASON THAT THIS

WAS NOT DOCUMENTED IN THE SAME WAY THAT IT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE
IS BECAUSE IT WAS ALWAYS ASCERTAINABLE FROM THE TAX RETURNS.
AND DR. BOHMAN TESTIFIED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE FAMILY
WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY THIS BACK AS IT WAS SHOWN IN THE
TAX SAVINGS. AND WE GOT THE ACCOUNTANTS, WE PUT THE
ACCOUNTANTS TO WORK, THEY FIGURED OUT WHAT THE TAX SAVINGS
WERE.

AND IT'S AN OBLIGATION HE HAS TO PAY.
THE COURT:

LET ME TELL YOU, AND IT WAS A HOTLY

CONTESTED ISSUE AND ~

AND I REMEMBER VERY WELL YOUR

CROSS-EXAMINATION ATTACKING WHETHER THIS WAS JUST AN
EXPEDIENCY THAT HAD BEEN CREATED.

AND AT THE TIME AS I

LISTENED CAREFULLY TO THE EVIDENCE, I FELT THAT THE EVIDENCE
PREPONDERATED IN FAVOR OF THE OBLIGATION.
ASCERTAINABLE FROM THE TAX RETURNS.

I THINK IT WAS

I LOOKED AT IT, THAT THIS

WAS A FAMILY ARRANGEMENT AND THEREFORE, THAT THE RECORD
KEEPING WAS PROBABLY LESS THAN WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.

BUT

I SENSED IN LISTENING TO THE TESTIMONY THAT DR. BOHMAN WAS
BEING TRUTHFUL WITH THE COURT.
HAD, AND SO I —
ACCEPTED IT.

AND THAT WAS THE IMPRESSION I

IT WAS JUST ON AN ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY, AND I

HOWEVER, I DON'T THINK THAT EVEN ON A MORAL

OBLIGATION, EVEN ON A FAMILY ARRANGEMENT, THAT YOU CAN ENFORCE
SOMETHING BEYOND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

SO I WILL LIMIT
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IT TO THAT EXTENT.
MR. DART:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

MS. MAYCOCK:

YOUR HONOR, NUMBER 36, A MUCH SMALLER

5|| PROBLEM

—

THE COURT:
WELL, NEVER MIND.
MS. MAYCOCK:

AND ONE OTHER THING THAT I WANTED TO —
I THINK I'VE PROBABLY SAID ALL I NEED TO.
THE PARTIES HAD A LOAN THAT THEY MADE TO

PLAINTIFF'S SON BY A PRIOR MARRIAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,320.
OUR POSITION WAS THAT THAT WAS A MARITAL ASSET.

THE MONEY

WENT TO MRS. BOHMAN, AND DR. BOHMAN FELT THAT HE SHOULD HAVE
THAT AND THAT SHOULD BE COUNTED AS A MARITAL, AS HIS SHARE OF
THAT.
THE COURT:

THAT WAS NUMBER —

OBJECTION NUMBER

MS. MAYCOCK:

36.

THE COURT:

36.

MR. DART:

AND THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT THIS WAS

WHAT?

MONEY THAT HAD COME IN AND HAD BEEN USED, AND OF COURSE THIS
IS A CASE WHERE NO STONE IS LEFT UNTURNED.
DIDN'T —

AND THE COURT

MADE NO RULING AS TO WHETHER THAT WAS ONE OF THE

MANY CREDITS THAT THE DOCTOR WAS SEEKING.

THAT IT WAS —

THE TIME OF TRIAL, THERE REALLY WAS NO ASSET LEFT.
THE COURT:
DESK.

I'VE LEFT ANOTHER DOCUMENT IN ON MY

EXCUSE ME FOR JUST A MINUTE.

BY

